No. 10-3022 ____________________________________________ IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ____________________________________________ EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Applicant/Appellee, v. SCHWAN'S HOME SERVICE, INC., Respondent/Appellant. ____________________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota ____________________________________________ BRIEF OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AS APPELLEE ____________________________________________ P. DAVID LOPEZ General Counsel LORRAINE C. DAVIS Acting Associate General Counsel VINCENT J. BLACKWOOD Assistant General Counsel JULIE L. GANTZ Attorney EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of General Counsel 131 M St., N.E., 5th Floor Washington, D.C. 20507-0001 (202) 663-4718 Julie.gantz@eeoc.gov SUMMARY OF CASE AND STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT This is an appeal from a decision enforcing an administrative subpoena issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in conjunction with an investigation of a charge filed by a former employee of the respondent that alleges sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation in connection with respondent's management training program. After respondent refused to provide information about the program, including the selection criteria for the program, and the breakdown by sex of those selected into the program and those who successfully completed the program, the Commission issued a subpoena for that information. The district court correctly ruled that the Commission is entitled to the information it seeks because it is relevant to the investigation of a valid charge of discrimination. The court also correctly rejected respondent's premature attacks on the merits of the charge that ignore the fact that this is a subpoena enforcement action in conjunction with an administrative investigation and not a motion to dismiss a judicial complaint. Because this is a routine subpoena enforcement action applying established legal precedent to an uncomplicated factual record, the Commission does not believe oral argument is warranted. TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY OF CASE AND STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 STATEMENT OF ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 A. Course of Proceedings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 B. Statement of Facts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 C. Magistrate Judge's Decision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 D. District Court's Decision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 STANDARD OF REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ENFORCING THE SUBPOENA BASED ON ITS FINDING THAT THE INFORMATION SOUGHT IS RELEVANT TO THE EEOC'S INVESTIGATION OF A VALID TITLE VII CHARGE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE INFORMATION SOUGHT IN THE SUBPOENA IS RELEVANT TO MILLIREN'S ORIGINAL CHARGE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Blue Bell Boots v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 Clayton v. White Hall Sch. District, 778 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1985). . . . . . . . .29 EEOC v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 711 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1983). . . . . . . .26 EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., 94 F.3d 738 (1st Cir. 1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 EEOC v. Bay Shipbuilding Corp., 668 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1981). . . . . . . . . . . 41 EEOC v. Children's Hospital Medical Ctr., 719 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1983). . . . . .31 EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 EEOC v. City of Norfolk Police Department, 45 F.3d 80 (4th Cir. 1995). . . . . . 32 EEOC v. Dillon Cos., 310 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985). . . . . . . . . 38 EEOC v. Kronos, 620 F.3d 287 (3rd Cir. 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 EEOC v. Md. Cup Corp., 785 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 EEOC v. Miss.Coll., 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 EEOC v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 775 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1985). . . . . .21, 24 EEOC v. Roadway Express, 750 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1984). . . . . . . . . . . . 31, 38 EEOC v. S.C. National Bank, 562 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1977). . . . . . . . . . . . 31 EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984). . . . . . . . .17, 23, 24, 25, 27, 38, 39 EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002). . . . . . . . . 26 EEOC v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., No. 00- 2153, 2000 WL 1610617 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 EEOC v. Technocrest System, 448 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2006). . . . . . . . . . 16, 21 EEOC v. Tempel Steel Co., 814 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1987). . . . . . . . . . 21, 24, 31 EEOC v. The Bailey Co., Inc., 563 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977). . . . . . . . . . . . 29 EEOC v. United Air Lines, 287 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2002). . . . . . . . . 16, 40, 41 Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1971). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 Webb v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 95 F.R.D. 357 (E.D. Ark. 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 STATUTES AND REGULATIONS Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 38 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2 28 U.S.C. § 1291. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 32 National Labor Relations Act 29 U.S.C. § 161. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1, 2 RULES Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The district court had jurisdiction over this proceeding to enforce an administrative subpoena pursuant to §§ 706(b) and 710 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (incorporating § 11 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 161, which provides that the district courts have jurisdiction to enforce administrative subpoenas). This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal from the district court's final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The district court issued its order enforcing the subpoena on June 30, 2010. A.6. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on August 26, 2010. A.247. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in enforcing the EEOC's subpoena based on its finding that the information sought is relevant to the EEOC's investigation of a valid Title VII charge. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984) EEOC v. Technocrest Sys., Inc., 448 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2006) EEOC v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 775 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1985) 2. Whether the district court correctly ruled that the information sought in the subpoena is relevant to Milliren's original charge. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984) EEOC v. Roadway Express, 750 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1984) STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. Course of Proceedings This is a subpoena enforcement action pursuant to § 710 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-9, which incorporates by reference § 11 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 161. On October 5, 2009, the EEOC filed an application for an order to show cause why a subpoena issued by the agency on February 20, 2009, should not be enforced. A.200. On March 8, 2010, the magistrate judge granted the application and directed the company to comply with the subpoena. A.39. The district court overruled the company's objections to the magistrate judge's order and granted the application on June 30, 2010. A.6. This appeal followed. B. Statement of Facts Kim Milliren filed a charge with the EEOC on June 19, 2007, alleging that her former employer, Schwan's Home Service, violated Title VII. Her charge stated: I was harassed, demoted, and informed that I would not graduate from the General Manager Development Program. On or about March 27, 2007, Jeffrey Moffis, Local General Manager, addressed me as "woman" two times. On or about March 28, 2007, Mr. Moffis laughed at me when I told him that I was not comfortable with him and customer service managers joking around about the offensive material that was emailed to local general managers by George VanOverbeke, District Manager. On or about April 5, 2007, I complained to Jim Petry, facilitation, about the derogatory emails. On or about April 6, 2007, I complained to my direct supervisor, Sue B[eary], Vice President of Business Initiatives. On or about April 27, 2007, Mike Wells, Director of Training, told me that I was not demonstrating leadership skills, that I would not graduate, and that the best position they could offer me upon completion of the program was that of a customer service manager. On May 4, 2007, I resigned. I believe that I have been discriminated against on the basis of my sex, female, and in retaliation for having complained about harassment based on sex. This is in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. A.75. Schwan's is a frozen food home delivery company offering delivery service throughout the country. A.81 (Schwan 8/13/07 position letter to EEOC at 3). The company operates through facilities known as "depots," each of which is run by a Location General Manager (LGM). A.80 (position letter at 2). Schwan's requires all newly hired LGMs to undergo a 16-week training course through its General Manager Development Program (GMDP). A.81-82. The GMDP prepares trainees to oversee all aspects of a depot's operations. A.80 (position letter to EEOC at 2 n.2). Schwan's submitted a response to the charge on August 13, 2007. A.79. The company maintained that Milliren's performance was unsatisfactory throughout her time in the GMDP and that her performance problems predated her complaints about Moffis' behavior and the emails she had seen. A.82-83. Schwan's stated that it gave Milliren the option of continuing the GMDP for three additional months to improve her performance or transferring to a position where GMDP graduation was not required but that Milliren declined those offers. A.83. After the EEOC began investigating her charge, Milliren told an investigator that Jeffrey Moffis, the LGM assigned to train her, rejected a female applicant for a customer service manager position because she would be leaving three children at home. A.99 (EEOC's 12/19/07 request for information). Milliren also informed the EEOC that the company's Vice President of Business Initiatives, Sue Beary, told her that, if she successfully completed the GMDP, she would be only the second female LGM out of 500 LGMs nationwide. See A.131 (EEOC Determination on Schwan's Petition to Revoke or Modify Subpoena at 2). According to Milliren, Beary also told Milliren's coworker Patty Bakala, the only other woman in the GMDP at the time, to "act more like the boys" to improve her performance. Id. The EEOC sent Schwan's a written request for information on November 29, 2007, asking for the name and sex of each employee who attended the GMDP, completed the GMDP, or did not complete the GMDP from January 1, 2006, to the present. A.92. After Schwan's reported only the names of the eight people who failed to complete the GMDP in 2007, the EEOC sent another request for information on December 19, 2007. A.97. This request for eleven items included documents relating to Milliren's complaints about Moffis, documents relating to Milliren's alleged performance problems, Milliren's personnel file, the same requests for the gender breakdown of the GMDP, and requests for responses regarding additional allegations Milliren related to the Commission during its investigation. A.98-99. When Schwan's failed to respond, the Commission issued a subpoena requiring that the company produce the eleven items listed on the second request for information. A.103-07 (first subpoena received May 7, 2008). Schwan's responded on May 14, 2008, with a petition to revoke or modify the subpoena. A.112. The company objected to six of the eleven requests, arguing that because "[t]he scope of Milliren's Charge clearly limits her allegation (and the corresponding investigation) to one of disparate treatment because of her gender when she was asked to repeat the management training program," the information about the gender breakdown for and processes surrounding the GMDP was not relevant to the charge. A.122 (petition to revoke or modify at 11). The Commission issued a determination on July 21, 2008, that modified several items, but otherwise rejected the company's petition and ordered the company to comply with the subpoena. A.136, 138-39. Schwan's submitted documents complying with eight of the eleven items subpoenaed. A.143-146. Schwan's continued to object to the requests regarding the gender make-up of the company's general managers, selection process for the GMDP, and gender breakdown of successful graduates of the GMDP. A.144-45. While the EEOC's subpoena was still pending, Milliren filed an amended charge with the EEOC on January 31, 2009, adding an allegation that Schwan's discriminated against women as a class through the GMDP. A.148. The amended charge repeats verbatim the allegations of the original charge and adds the following language: "[I]t is also my belief that the Respondent discriminates against females, as a class, in regards to its General Manager Development Program in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended." A.148. In its response to the notice of the charge, Schwan's asserted that the amended charge was untimely, outside the scope of the EEOC's jurisdiction, and too indefinite. A.154-55. The Commission served Schwan's with a second subpoena on February 20, 2009, seeking the same three categories of information that had been disputed under the original charge: (1) a list of general managers currently employed with Schwan's including name, gender, and date of hire; (2) all documents related to how persons are selected for the GMDP; (3) a list of persons who successfully completed the GMDP from 1/1/06 to the present by name, gender, date of hire, date of completion of program, current employment status, and last known address and phone number. A.157-158. Schwan's submitted a petition to revoke or modify the subpoena on February 27, 2009, arguing that the subpoena seeks information beyond the EEOC's investigative authority; the requests are vague, overly broad, and unduly burdensome; and the subpoena seeks information irrelevant to the charge. A.162-175. The EEOC issued a determination on August 4, 2009, modifying the subpoena to limit the requests geographically, but rejecting the company's arguments and ordering the company to comply with the subpoena. A.177, 178, 184-85, 187. To date, Schwan's has not complied with the subpoena. The Commission filed an order to show cause why a subpoena should not be enforced on October 5, 2009. C. Magistrate Judge's Decision On March 8, 2010, the magistrate judge rejected the company's objections to the subpoena and directed the company to comply by March 29, 2010. A.39-40. The magistrate judge first ruled that Schwan's could not challenge the timeliness of the amended charge nor dispute Milliren's standing to allege a class claim in a subpoena enforcement action because such arguments were "premature" given that the Commission was still investigating the merits of Milliren's allegations. A.52- 54 (Order at 14-16) (citing cases). The magistrate judge held that, in any event, the amended charge relates back to the original charge and is therefore timely. A.54. The magistrate judge noted that the relevant inquiry was whether the added language in the amended charge "constitutes unlawful employment practices related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original charge." A.56. Because "[t]he claim of being discriminated against as an individual based on gender in connection with the GMDP is not disparate to the claim of being discriminated against as a class based on gender in connection with this same program," the amended charge relates back to the original charge. A.56. The magistrate added that it was "entirely conceivable" that the EEOC's investigation of the original charge would "implicate gender discrimination across a class of people." A.56-57. The magistrate judge rejected the company's contention that the amended charge could not relate back to the original charge because, according to Schwan's, the original charge alleged only two instances of sexual harassment and retaliation for complaining about it. A.56-57 (Order at 18-19 n.10). The magistrate judge stated that "Schwan's misread Milliren's original Charge," ignoring that "the Charge plainly state[ed] that she believed she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex" and that Milliren placed an "X" in the box next to "sex" in the section of the charge instructing the filer to check the bases of discrimination. A.56-57 (Order at 18-19 n.10). The magistrate also noted that the EEOC learned during its investigation that Milliren was told that a female applicant had not been hired as a customer service manager because she had children at home, that Milliren learned she was one of only two women in the GMDP at the time, that one of those women was told to "act more like the boys" to improve her performance, and that Milliren was told that she would be only the second female LGM out of the company's 500 LGMs nationwide. A.57-58. The magistrate judge concluded that "during the course of the investigation of the Charge, support was developed to suggest that the disparate treatment allegedly experienced by Milliren was not confined to her, and that it impacted not only the performance and graduation of her and other women from the GMDP, but possibly selection into the program as well." A.58 (Order at 20). The magistrate judge declined to rule on whether Milliren lacked standing to allege a class claim in her amended charge, noting that the cases relied upon by Schwan's all involved class action litigation, not an EEOC investigation of a charge. A.59 (Order at 21). The magistrate judge also rejected the company's contention that the amended charge did not meet the requirements of the EEOC regulation requiring a "clear and concise statement of the facts, including pertinent dates, constituting the unlawful employment practice." A.60 (Order at 22) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (b)). The magistrate judge concluded that "the Amended Charge generally set forth that Milliren believed that Schwan's discriminated against females in regard to the GMDP. The allegation is confined to one class of people with respect to one specific program at Schwan's." A.60. Because "it may be reasonably inferred from the Amended Charge as a whole that the alleged class discrimination occurred during the same timeframe that the individual discrimination against Milliren allegedly occurred," the information in the amended charge "was sufficient to put Schwan's on notice of the claims against it." A.60 (Order at 22). The magistrate judge held that the information sought by the subpoena was relevant to the amended charge. A.62. In the court's view, "[e]xamination of the gender breakdown of the current Location General Manager population is relevant to Milliren's claim that she was told that had she been hired, she would have been only the second female Location General Manager nationwide." A.63 (Order at 25). Information regarding the current LGM population, information about the selection process for the GMDP, and a list of those who successfully completed the GMDP "would permit the EEOC to investigate and evaluate whether gender discrimination is occurring at Schwan's because of the GMDP and shed light on whether Schwan's has persisted in a pattern of discrimination across a class of people." A.63. The magistrate judge noted that "an examination of Milliren's comparators involves discovering how they got into the GMDP, how they were treated, and if and when they were hired as Location General Managers after graduation from the program." A.64 (Order at 26). The magistrate judge determined that information about the selection process for the GMDP was relevant to the EEOC's investigation because "Milliren's claims were driven by all circumstances of her employment" and, even though she was selected for the GMDP, "the selection process has bearing on the gender discrimination allegations surrounding the GMDP, and whether the selection process played a role in so few women graduating from the program and going on to become a Location General Manager." A.66-67 (Order at 28-29). The magistrate judge stated that "[t]he EEOC's subpoena did not amount to a fishing expedition. It was designed to examine facts bearing on the GMDP program." A.67 (Order at 29). Finally, the magistrate judge rejected the company's argument that providing the requested information would be unduly burdensome. A.67 (Order at 29 n.12). Noting that Schwan's bears the burden of proving that producing the information would hinder its normal business operations, the magistrate judge stated that the company "provided this Court with no evidence to support its bald assertion that responding to these requests was too burdensome." A.67 (Order at 29 n.12). D. District Court's Decision The district court overruled the company's objections to the magistrate judge's order, adopted the order, granted the EEOC's application for order to show cause, and ordered Schwan's to comply with the subpoena. A.37 (Memorandum Opinion and Order at 32). The district court first held that it would treat the magistrate judge's order as a report and recommendation subject to de novo review because the enforcement of an administrative subpoena was dispositive, final and appealable. A.23 (Op. 18). The district court rejected the company's objections to the order regarding what Schwan's termed "the validity" of the amended charge. A.24-29. The court held that the subpoena is within the EEOC's authority and satisfies the EEOC's procedural requirements and deemed the company's timeliness and class standing arguments "premature." A.29 (Op. at 24). The court pointed out that "a subpoena enforcement 'proceeding is not the proper time to litigate the merits of a claim, either procedurally or substantively.'" Id. (quoting EEOC v. Roadway Express, 750 F.2d 40, 42 (6th Cir. 1984)). The district court also rejected the company's argument that the amended charge is invalid because it exceeds Milliren's personal knowledge and is improperly verified. A.26 (Op. at 21). The court noted that the charge on its face satisfies Title VII's requirements that a charge be in writing under oath or affirmation because Milliren signed the charge declaring under penalty of perjury that the allegations stated were true and correct. Id. The court also stated that it had "no reason to question the veracity of the class allegation in this proceeding." Id. The court noted that counsel for the EEOC "confirmed at oral argument that Milliren informed the Commission of her desire to amend her charge, and that the impetus for amending the charge was both the information the EEOC had developed during its investigation and Milliren's own information based on her own experiences at Schwan's." A.26-27 (Op. at 21-22). In response to the company's argument that the amended charge was untimely because it was filed more than 300 days after Milliren resigned from the GMDP, the court determined that, "[b]ecause EEOC regulations allow for the possibility that the Amended Charge may relate back to the date Milliren filed the original charge, the Court cannot find that the Amended Charge is untimely on its face." A.27 (Op. at 22). The district court refused to reach the merits of the relation back dispute, finding that question should be determined "if and when the EEOC or Milliren files a complaint against Schwan's that makes such class allegations." A.28 (Op. at 23). The court made the same ruling on the company's argument that Milliren lacked standing to allege class discrimination in hiring because she was hired into the GMPD program, holding that such a defense could be raised if and when a complaint is filed. A.28-29 (Op. at 23-24). The district court held that the information sought in the subpoena was relevant to the class allegations in the amended charge "because such information 'might cast light on' those allegations." A.32-33 (Op. at 27-28) (quoting EEOC v. Shell Oil, 466 U.S. 54, 69 (1984)). The court also held that, "even if the original charge were to govern the Court's relevance inquiry, the information the EEOC seeks in the February 2009 subpoena would be relevant. Information may be relevant even if it extends beyond the case of the person who filed the charge." A.33 (Op. at 28). The court noted that courts routinely allow the enforcement of subpoenas seeking information going beyond information directly tied to the charging party's personal experiences. A.33-34 (discussing EEOC v. Technocrest Sys., 448 F.3d 1035, 1039 (8th Cir. 2006); EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., No. 06- MC-42, 2006 WL 3712941, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 1, 2006); EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738 (1st Cir. 1996); and EEOC v. Gen. Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 1976)). The district court found EEOC v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., No. 00-2153, 2000 WL 1610617 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2000), inapposite because in that case, the EEOC was precluded from obtaining information about gender discrimination where the charge alleged race discrimination and the EEOC had not advanced any arguments that gender information was relevant to the allegations of racism. A.35 (Op. at 30). "Here, by contrast, the original charge alleges that Milliren faced retaliation and sex-based discrimination during her participation in the GMDP, when she was training to become a General Manager." Id. In the court's view, the gender breakdown of the General Managers currently employed by Schwan's and a gender breakdown of all individuals who successfully completed the GMDP are "'like and related' to the acts specified in the charge." Id. The court stated, "[i]nformation that Schwan's employs very few females as General Managers, or that very few females successfully complete the GMDP, may, in conjunction with other evidence, support a reasonable cause finding that Schwan's discriminated against Milliren on account of sex while she participated in the GMDP, or may be relevant to 'like or related' allegations of sex-based discrimination." A.35-36 (Op. at 30-31). The court also held that information about the company's selection process for the GMDP could potentially support a reasonable cause finding "because there may be a connection between alleged efforts to exclude women from the GMDP in the first instance and alleged sex-based discrimination and retaliation for the few women whom Schwan's selects for the GMDP." A.36 (Op. at 31). The court concluded that the "claims of discrimination in the process of selecting individuals to participate in the GMDP and claims of discrimination in the hiring and retention of General Managers are, at a minimum, 'like or related' to the acts set forth in the [original] charge." A.36 (Op. at 31). Because the information sought in the subpoena "'might cast light on the allegations' Milliren makes in the original charge, and might support claims that are like or related to the acts set forth in that charge," the court held that the subpoena "satisfies the broad standard of relevancy that applies during an EEOC investigation." A.37 (Op. at 32). The district court also rejected the company's argument "in passing" that complying with the subpoena would be overly burdensome. The court agreed with the magistrate judge's conclusion that Schwan's "'provided this Court with no evidence to support its bald assertion that responding to these requests was too burdensome.'" A.37 (Op. at 32 n.2) (quoting magistrate judge's Order at 29 n.12). The court ordered Schwan's to comply with the subpoena by July 21, 2010. A.38 (Op. at 33). STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews a district court's enforcement of a subpoena for abuse of discretion. EEOC v. Technocrest Sys., Inc., 448 F.3d 1035, 1038 (8th Cir. 2006). "A finding by the district court that documents are reasonably relevant to a legitimate agency purpose cannot be overturned absent a showing that the factual determinations on which it is based are clearly erroneous or that the ruling itself constitutes an abuse of discretion." EEOC v. United Air Lines, Inc., 287 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2002). SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The district court order enforcing the Commission's subpoena should be affirmed. The information sought is manifestly relevant to the Commission's investigation of Milliren's individual allegations of gender discrimination and the allegation of broader discrimination against women through the company's manager training program. Schwan's does not dispute that the subpoenaed information is relevant to Milliren's amended charge. Instead, Schwan's attacks the "validity" of the amended charge, assuming incorrectly that the original charge rather than the amended charge governs the relevance inquiry. Schwan's assesses the class allegation alone in a vacuum, ignoring the detailed allegations that precede it. Schwan's also loses sight of the fact that this is a subpoena enforcement proceeding, not an action on the merits. The company's attacks on the merits of the charge are premature, as subpoena enforcement proceedings are designed to be summary in nature. The district court was required to enforce the Commission's subpoena as long as the investigation is within the agency's authority, the subpoena is not too indefinite, and the information sought is reasonably relevant. The amended charge meets these criteria. Schwan's will have an opportunity to raise a defense to Milliren's or the EEOC's claims of discrimination if and when either files a lawsuit. The company first argues that Milliren's amended charge does not allege sufficient facts to state a violation of Title VII, This argument is untenable because "a charge of employment discrimination is not the equivalent of a complaint initiating a lawsuit." EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68 (1984). The purpose of a charge is to give the Commission notice that someone believes Title VII has been violated. A charge need only be written, sufficiently precise to indentify the parties, and describe generally the action complained of. Milliren's charge meets these requirements, as it is written, identifies the parties, describes generally the practices complained of-discrimination against Milliren and other women through its manager training program. The charge lists the dates of discrimination and specifies the type of discrimination and the program that is the alleged instrument of the discrimination, the GMDP. Although Schwan's accuses the Commission of undertaking a "fishing expedition" to uncover additional facts of discrimination, developing additional facts to enable the agency to make a cause finding is indeed the point of every EEOC investigation. And, contrary to the company's assertion, Milliren's charge was sufficient to meet Title VII's requirement that a charge be under oath. Milliren described the individual gender discrimination she suffered and made a verified assertion that she believed Schwan's was also discriminating against other women in the GMDP. That is all that is required. Schwan's further argues that the amended charge is invalid because Milliren failed to allege that she was aggrieved by "a class-wide employment practice." Schwan's has couched this argument in the past as a lack of standing. Because standing refers only to a litigant's ability to sue in federal court, the company now argues that Milliren has failed to satisfy the "statutory aggrieved-person requirement," or "standing to make a valid charge." The problem with this argument is that there is no statutory requirement that a charging party be personally aggrieved by the type of discrimination alleged in a charge. Under Title VII, a charge may be filed by a person claiming to have been discriminated against "or by others on behalf of an aggrieved person." Schwan's did not address this language in its opening brief. Furthermore, the company's reliance on cases discussing the standards applicable when the Commission seeks information regarding a potential violation not alleged in the charge is of no relevance here, where Milliren alleges that she was subjected to sex discrimination in her charge and the Commission is investigating her claims of sex discrimination. The company's protest that Milliren's amended charge is untimely because it was filed more than 300 days after she resigned is premature, as the district court ruled. The timeliness of a charge may be considered during a subpoena enforcement proceeding only where a charge is "untimely on its face." It is undisputed that Milliren's original charge was timely, and any allegations related to or growing out of the subject matter of the charge will relate back to the original charge. The district court correctly ruled that because the amended charge may relate back to the original charge, the charge is not untimely on its face. The company's argument that the amended charge is untimely on its face and does not relate to the original charge rests on a mischaracterization of the charge as alleging only sexual harassment and retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment. This distortion is puzzling given that Schwan's has repeatedly acknowledged throughout proceedings in this matter that Milliren's original charge alleged gender discrimination in her demotion and failure to complete the GMDP. Once the company's belated attempt to rewrite Milliren's charge is rejected, the district court's ruling that the amended charge is not untimely on its face is clearly correct. The district court's ruling that the information sought in the subpoena is relevant to Milliren's original charge was also correct. The EEOC is empowered by statute to obtain any evidence "relevant to the charge under investigation." This relevancy requirement is generously construed. The Supreme Court has directed that the Commission may have access to virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer. Courts have consistently held that in investigating a charge of discrimination, the EEOC is not limited to the specific allegations of the charge under investigation. Milliren's charge alleges that she was "harassed, demoted, and informed I would not graduate from the program" and alluded to facts suggesting that some of the company's managers had a negative view of women. After Milliren filed her initial charge, she provided information to the Commission suggesting that there may be a pattern of discrimination against women through the GMDP. This included a statement that if she graduated from the GMDP, Milliren would be one of only two women managers among the company's 500 location general managers; that she was one of only two women in the trainee class at the time; that the other woman in her trainee class was told to act more like the boys to succeed in the program; and that a woman had been rejected for a customer service job because she had young children. The Commission's subpoena should therefore be enforced. ARGUMENT I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ENFORCING THE SUBPOENA BASED ON ITS FINDING THAT THE INFORMATION SOUGHT IS RELEVANT TO THE EEOC'S INVESTIGATION OF A VALID TITLE VII CHARGE. Congress granted the EEOC broad authority to obtain "any evidence . . . that relates to unlawful employment practices covered by [Title VII] and is relevant to the charge under investigation." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a). As the district court noted, "[t]hese broad investigative powers include the power to request information by means of an administrative subpoena." A.30 (Op. at 25). Subpoena enforcement proceedings are designed to be summary in nature. "If the EEOC shows that the investigation is for a legitimate purpose and the requested documents are relevant to the investigation, the EEOC is entitled to the documents subpoenaed unless the subpoenaed party 'demonstrates that judicial enforcement of the subpoena would amount to an abuse of the court's process.'" Technocrest, 448 F.3d at 1038-39 (quoting EEOC v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 775 F.2d 928, 930-31 (8th Cir. 1985)); see also EEOC v. Tempel Steel Co., 814 F.2d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 1987) ("As long as the investigation is within the agency's authority, the subpoena is not too indefinite, and the information sought is reasonably relevant, the district court must enforce an administrative subpoena."). The district court correctly ruled that the EEOC satisfied these requirements in this case. This appeal concerns a subpoena issued in conjunction with the investigation of Milliren's amended charge which states that she was informed that she would not graduate from the company's management training program, and alleges, "I believe that I have been discriminated against on the basis of my sex, female, and in retaliation for having complained about harassment based on sex, [and] . . . that the Respondent discriminates against females as a class, in regard to its General Manager Development Program." A.148. The subpoena requests information about the makeup of the company's general managers by sex, about the selection of candidates for the management training program, and about the sex and status of persons who have successfully completed the training program. A.158. As the district court correctly ruled, this information "is relevant to the class allegations in the Amended Charge because such information 'might cast light on' those allegations." A.32-33 (Op. at 27-28) (quoting Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 69). As in the district court, Schwan's does not dispute on appeal that the subpoenaed information is relevant to Milliren's amended charge. See A.32 (Op. at 27) ("Schwan's does not dispute that all three categories of information listed in the February 2009 Subpoena are relevant to the Amended Charge's allegations that Schwan's 'discriminates against females, as a class, in regard to' the GMDP."). Instead, the company once again levels a series of baseless attacks on the amended charge itself and bases its challenge to the subpoena "on the erroneous assumption that the original charge, rather than the Amended Charge, governs the relevance inquiry." A.32 (Op. at 27). As we explain in detail below, each of the company's attacks on the amended charge suffers from legal and factual flaws. In addition, as the district court recognized, they relate to the merits of the charge, rather than its validity, and, therefore are not relevant to this subpoena enforcement proceeding. As one court has aptly put it, to permit a respondent to withhold information relevant to the investigation of a charge of discrimination on the ground that the allegations in the charge lack merit or cannot serve as the basis for an enforcement action, "is not only to place the cart before the horse, but to substitute a different driver for the one appointed by Congress." Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 36 (4th Cir. 1971). It is for the EEOC-and not the respondent-to determine in the first instance whether a charge is meritorious and covered by Title VII. See Peat, Marwick, 775 F.2d at 930 ("The initial determination of the coverage question is left to the administrative agency seeking enforcement of the subpoena."). "If every possible defense, procedural or substantive, were litigated at the subpoena enforcement stage, administrative investigations obviously would be subjected to great delay." Tempel Steel, 814 F.2d at 485. Schwan's argues first that Milliren's amended charge is invalid because "it fails to set forth any facts constituting illegal discrimination." Schwan's br. at 21. The charge contains an assertion that Milliren believes that Schwan's "discriminates against females, as a class, in regard to its [GMDP] in violation of Title VII." A.148. According to the company, however, this allegation is insufficient "because it provides nothing more than Milliren's unsubstantiated 'belief.'" Schwan's br. at 22. In making this argument, Schwan's is seeking to impose on this subpoena enforcement proceeding a pleading requirement akin to that applicable to complaints filed in federal court. Cf. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (judicial complaint must plead facts sufficient to show that allegations of complaint are "plausible"). The Supreme Court flatly rejected this argument in Shell Oil, stating that "a charge of employment discrimination is not the equivalent of a complaint initiating a lawsuit." Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 68. The Court explained that "[t]he function of a Title VII charge, rather, is to place the EEOC on notice that someone . . . believes that an employer has violated the title." Id. (emphasis added). When the EEOC receives a charge stating that an individual "believes" that Title VII has been violated, the Court explained, "[t]he EEOC then undertakes an investigation into the complainant's allegations of discrimination. Only if the Commission, on the basis of information collected during its investigation, determines that there is 'reasonable cause' to believe that the employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, does the matter assume the form of an adversary proceeding." Id. The company's argument that a charge must contain facts substantiating the charging party's belief that a violation has occurred before the EEOC can investigate it stands this procedure on its head. The EEOC's regulations provide that "a charge is sufficient when the Commission receives from the person making the charge a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b). See also Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 72 (charging party may not "merely . . . allege that an employer has violated Title VII"). Milliren's charge clearly meets these requirements. It is written, identifies the parties, and describes generally the practices complained of: discrimination against Milliren and other women in the company's management training program. The charge lists the date parameters of discrimination as March 2007 to May 2007, specifies the type of discrimination (against women) and the program that is the alleged instrument of the discrimination, the GMDP, and alleges that the GMDP violates Title VII. See A.148 (amended charge).<1> Schwan's accuses the Commission of "using its investigatory powers to develop new facts" and repeatedly characterizes the Commission's investigation as a "fishing expedition," citing the lack of detailed facts in Milliren's class allegation. See Schwan's br. at 15, 18, 22, 27, 32, 36, 38, 48. The development of additional facts is, of course, the point of every EEOC investigation-to uncover information that will allow the agency to make a cause finding. See EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he EEOC is entitled to obtain the facts necessary to determine whether it can proceed to the enforcement stage."). For that reason, the EEOC is not required to show probable cause or reasonable cause before conducting its investigation of a charge. See EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 754, 755 (8th Cir. 1977) ("[I]t is the function of such investigative subpoenas to establish whether reasonable cause to bring a discrimination charge exists."); EEOC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 711 F.2d 780, 783 (7th Cir. 1983) ("In many instances, the purpose of the EEOC investigation is to determine whether probable cause does in fact exist."). Accordingly, EEOC investigative subpoenas "'may be enforced for investigative purposes unless they are plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose.'" EEOC v. Dillon Cos., 310 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted). Schwan's contends that Milliren's amended charge fails to "meet the statutory requirement of an oath" because she did not allege detailed facts of class- wide discrimination. See Schwan's br. at 25-26. This again reflects the company's misunderstanding of the role of the Commission's investigation. Milliren alleged facts about how she was treated at Schwan's as a trainee in the GMDP and alleged, inter alia, that Schwan's decided to demote her to a customer service manager and to oust her from the program because she is a woman. A.148. She also made a verified assertion that she believed Schwan's was discriminating against other women in the same program. Id. That is all that was required to constitute a valid charge. Under Title VII, the EEOC "may insist that the employer disgorge any evidence relevant to the allegations of discrimination contained in the charge, regardless of the strength of the evidentiary foundation for those allegations." Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 72. Next, Schwan's argues that the amended charge is invalid because "Milliren does not claim to be aggrieved by any class-wide employment practice." Schwan's br. at 28. The company made a similar argument in district court, contending that the allegation of discrimination against a class of women in Milliren's amended charge is invalid because she lacks standing to assert those claims. See R.18 (Objections to Magistrate's Order at 8-10). The district court rejected this argument, holding that the argument that Milliren does not have standing to pursue claims of sex discrimination against other women "is a defense that Schwan's may raise if and when the EEOC or Milliren files a complaint against Schwan's," but is not relevant to this subpoena enforcement proceeding. A.29 (Op. at 24). See also A.58 (MJ Order at 20-21) ("this subpoena enforcement proceeding is not the proper forum to assert this challenge [to standing]"). On appeal, Schwan's does not dispute the district court's ruling that the question of Milliren's standing to bring suit against the company on claims of discrimination against other women is not relevant to this proceeding. Instead, Schwan's insists that it is not challenging Milliren's standing to bring suit, but rather whether she satisfied the "statutory aggrieved-person requirement-i.e. standing to make a valid charge." Schwan's br. at 30-31. The basic flaw in this argument is that there is no statutory requirement that a charging party be aggrieved by the discrimination alleged in a charge. On the contrary, the very statutory language relied on by the company makes clear that a valid charge may be filed by a person who does not claim to be aggrieved. Section 706(b) of Title VII provides that the EEOC shall investigate "[w]henever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(b) (emphasis added). As the magistrate recognized, this language makes clear "'that a discrimination charge may be filed with EEOC by any person claiming to have been discriminated against or by others on behalf of any aggrieved person.'" A.59 (MJ Order at 21) (quoting Webb v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 95 F.R.D. 357, 361 (E.D. Ark. 1982)) (emphasis added by magistrate). See also Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 778 F.2d 457, 459 (8th Cir. 1985) (an employee has a right to work in an environment free of discrimination, and a plaintiff has standing to sue for the violation of that right even if he or she is not a member of the minority group allegedly discriminated against); EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 482-83 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding white woman could allege discrimination against blacks based "on her own personal right to work in an environment unaffected by racial discrimination"); EEOC v. The Bailey Co., Inc., 563 F.2d 439, 454 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that white woman could complain of discrimination against black females and the EEOC could investigate the employer for racial discrimination). Schwan's does not respond to this point and instead simply ignores the language in the statute that is inconsistent with its argument. In the absence of any authority supporting its assertion of a "statutory aggrieved-person requirement," Schwan's resorts to a lengthy discussion of cases discussing the standards applicable when the EEOC seeks information regarding a potential violation that is not alleged in the charge under investigation. Schwan's br. at 36-39 (discussing EEOC v. Kronos, 620 F.3d 287 (3rd Cir. 2010) and EEOC v. Southern Farm Bureau, 2000 WL 1610617 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2000)). This issue is manifestly irrelevant to the validity of the subpoena based on Milliren's amended charge since Schwan's does not dispute that the information sought in the subpoena is relevant to the allegation of discrimination against a class of women contained in that charge. Kronos and Southern Farm are easily distinguished because, in those cases, the EEOC was attempting to investigate issues that were not alleged in the charges under investigation. In Kronos, the EEOC subpoenaed information relating to race discrimination against blacks during the investigation of a charge filed by a white woman alleging disability discrimination; in Southern Farm, the EEOC subpoenaed information relating to sex discrimination against women in conjunction with the investigation of a charge filed by a black man alleging race discrimination. Even if those decisions from other courts would be followed by this Court, they have no bearing on this case where the EEOC seeks enforcement of a subpoena requesting information relating to sex discrimination in the company's GMDP program in conjunction with the investigation of a charge that alleges sex discrimination in that program. Schwan's also argues the amended charge is untimely because it was filed more than 300 days after Milliren resigned. The district court correctly ruled that the company's challenge to the timeliness of Milliren's amended charge is premature. A.27-28 (Op. at 22-23). Arguments attacking the merits of a charge cannot serve as a basis for preventing the EEOC from investigating. See EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 719 F.2d 1426, 1429 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (EEOC's authority to investigate "is not abrogated because the party being investigated may have a valid defense to a subsequent suit by the agency"); see also EEOC v. S.C. Nat'l Bank, 562 F.2d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 1977) (claim that a charge was untimely could not be raised as a defense to EEOC's subpoena enforcement action); Tempel Steel, 814 F.2d at 485 (timeliness objection is not a proper defense to enforcement of a subpoena). "A district court should only examine the substance of the EEOC's underlying claim if the opposing party can show that there is no factual or legal support for the agency's preliminary determination to investigate." EEOC v. Roadway Express, 750 F.2d 40, 42 (6th Cir. 1984). Schwan's will be free to raise such defenses if and when a suit is filed. See id.<2> The only circumstance in which a court has suggested that the timeliness of a charge may be considered during a subpoena enforcement proceeding is where a charge is "untimely on its face" or "conceded to be untimely." EEOC v. City of Norfolk Police Dep't., 45 F.3d 80, 83 (4th Cir. 1995). It is undisputed that Milliren's original charge was timely filed. Although the amended charge was filed more than 300 days after Milliren left Schwan's, it is timely if it relates back to the original charge. Under EEOC's regulations, "[a] charge may be amended . . . to clarify and amplify allegations made therein" and "[s]uch amendments and amendments alleging additional acts which constitute unlawful employment practices related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original charge will relate back to the date the charge was first received." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b). Accordingly, the question of whether the amended charge is timely turns on whether the allegations in the charge are "related to or grow[] out of" the original, admittedly timely charge. As the district court correctly concluded, "[b]ecause EEOC regulations allow for the possibility that the Amended Charge may relate back to the date Milliren filed the original charge, the Court cannot find that the Amended Charge is untimely on its face." A.27 (Op. at 22). Accordingly, the court ruled that consideration of timeliness is premature. A.28 (Op. at 23). We submit the magistrate judge was correct in holding that Milliren's amended charge is timely because it relates back to the original charge (see A.54), but there is no reason for this Court to decide this question in a subpoena enforcement proceeding. Schwan's does not dispute the standards applied by the district court in support of its ruling. Rather, the company asserts that the charge is untimely on its face because "no construction of Milliren's original charge can support the notion that the amended charge related to or grew out of the original one." Schwan's br. at 42. This assertion, however, is based on the false premise that Milliren's original charge is limited to allegations of "discrete acts" of sexual harassment and retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment. See id. The company does not support this assertion with any analysis of the terms of the original charge. Instead, it falsely implies that the EEOC has conceded that the charge does not include an allegation of disparate treatment based on sex in the GMDP. Id. On the contrary, prior to the filing of the company's brief on appeal, everyone involved in this case, including Schwan's, has demonstrated an understanding that the charge alleges disparate treatment based on sex, in addition to sexual harassment and retaliation. An examination of the terms of the charge demonstrates the correctness of that understanding. In her original charge, Milliren alleges that, while participating in the GMDP, she was "harassed, demoted, and informed that I would not graduate" from the program. A.75. She states that her supervisor addressed her as "woman" twice and laughed at her when she protested the circulation of sexist emails and jokes sent by one of the company's vice presidents. Id. She alleges that when she complained to other managers in the company, her performance was attacked, she was informed she would not graduate from the GMDP, and could only become a customer service manager rather than a LGM. Id. She alleged that "I have been discriminated against on the basis of my sex." Id. A reasonable construction of this language is that Milliren alleges that her lack of success in the GMDP was based on her sex. Notwithstanding its recent protestations to the contrary, Schwan's has recognized from its first response to Milliren's charge that Milliren alleged a gender discrimination claim based on her failure to successfully complete the GMDP. In its response to the notice of Milliren's original charge, Schwan's stated on August 10, 2007, "[a]ssuming that her failure to graduate from training on schedule could be construed as an adverse employment action (which it can't), Milliren still lacks any evidence that: males received more favorable treatment; or she was meeting legitimate performance expectations of her employer." A.87. This reflects the company's clear understanding that Milliren alleged gender discrimination beyond sexual harassment in her charge. See also id. ("Milliren's allegation of gender discrimination fails for several reasons, most notably because she cannot satisfy her burden of showing that she was treated differently than similarly situated men."); id. ("[W]ith no evidence that her gender played any role in the decision to postpone graduation, the instant charge is without merit and should be dismissed."). Schwan's continued to address Milliren's broader gender discrimination allegations up until the filing of its appellate brief. The company's December 13, 2007, response to the EEOC's first request for information states that, "[b]ased on the above we submit that further review of the training program is unduly burdensome and of no support whatsoever to her gender discrimination claims, where Milliren was the only female who failed to complete the course and all other employees who failed to complete the course were male. This fact, coupled with the fact that Milliren's female classmate successfully completed the program and did so on time, renders any gender focused assessment of who did or did not complete the program meaningless. There is simply no support of Milliren's claims based on gender." A.95. In the company's May 14, 2008, petition to revoke or modify subpoena, Schwan's argued that "[t]he scope of Milliren's Charge clearly limits her allegation (and the corresponding investigation) to one of disparate treatment because of her gender when she was asked to repeat the management training program." A.122. The company's February 18, 2009, response to the notice of Milliren's amended charge states, "[t]he original charge did not allege discrimination 'in regard to' the GMDP; it asserted the limited allegation that Ms. Milliren failed to graduate and/or was demoted from the GMDP based on gender." A.154. The company's February 27, 2009, petition to revoke or modify the second subpoena states, "[w]e note, again, that the original charge did not allege discrimination 'in regard to' the General Manager Development Program (GMDP); it asserted the limited allegation that Ms. Milliren failed to graduate and/or was demoted from the GMDP based on gender." A.164. Once the company's belated attempt to rewrite Milliren's original charge is rejected, it is clear that the district court correctly ruled that the amended charge is not facially untimely. Accordingly, the company's argument that the subpoena should not be enforced because the amended charge is untimely should be rejected.<3> II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE INFORMATION SOUGHT IN THE SUBPOENA IS RELEVANT TO MILLIREN'S ORIGINAL CHARGE. The district court, after finding Milliren's amended charge valid, went on to decide that the subpoenaed information is also relevant to her original charge, which is indisputably valid. A.33 (Op. at 28). Because, for the reasons stated above, the court's finding that the amended charge is valid is correct, it is unnecessary for this Court to decide whether the information sought in the subpoena is relevant to her original charge. Nevertheless, we address the issue to respond to the company's appellate challenge to this aspect of the district court's decision, which distorts the record, advances an unduly restrictive standard of relevancy, and unfairly impugns the EEOC's actions in accepting Milliren's amended charge. Once again, as in its argument on timeliness, Schwan's bases its argument on an inaccurate characterization of Milliren's original charge. As we note, supra at 34-36, the company itself has acknowledged throughout these proceedings that Milliren's original charge contains an allegation that her treatment in the GMDP- including being informed that she would not graduate and would be demoted-was based on her sex. Milliren alleges she was "harassed, demoted, and informed that I would not graduate" from the program. A.75. The charge also alludes to facts suggesting that some of the company's managers had a negative view of women. When the charge is viewed accurately, the district court's decision that the EEOC's request for information regarding the sex of the company's managers and the administration of the GMDP is relevant to the investigation of the charge is clearly correct. Congress granted the EEOC broad power to obtain access to any evidence that is "relevant to the charge under investigation." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a). "The concept of relevancy is construed broadly when a charge is in the investigatory stage." EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall Coll., 775 F.2d 110, 116 (3d Cir. 1985). As the district court noted, courts have consistently interpreted the relevancy standard for Title VII generously, allowing the EEOC "access to virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer." Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 68-69; see also EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 613 (7th Cir. 1982) (agency may seek any information that "touches a matter under investigation"). Applying this broad standard, courts have held repeatedly that the agency's investigation is not limited to the specific allegations of the charge under investigation. See, e.g., EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., 94 F.3d 738, 746 (1st Cir. 1996) (a charge "is capable of supporting an EEOC investigation into both the discrimination described in the charge itself and into the surrounding circumstances (including a full probing of any evidence of discriminatory practices unearthed during the course of the initial investigation")); Roadway Express, 750 F.2d at 43 (the "relevancy limitation does not, however, force the EEOC only to review evidence concerning the specific charge"); Blue Bell Boots v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 1969) (information concerning "job classifications or hiring situations other than those of the complainants" is relevant to investigation of individual charges because it may show a pattern of race discrimination and may assist the EEOC in framing a remedy) (cited with approval in Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 69 n.20)). Although, as Schwan's notes, there are limitations to how far away the EEOC's investigation may move from the specific allegations of a charge, the information sought in the subpoena is closely related to Milliren's individual allegations and the request for it grew out of a reasonable investigation of those allegations. After Milliren filed her initial charge, she provided information to the EEOC suggesting that there might be a pattern of discrimination against women in the GMDP. These include the exchange of emails offensive to women by company managers that were tolerated in at least one workplace, the forcing out of the GMDP of one of only two women in the program after she complained about the derogatory emails and being referred to as "woman" by her supervisor; the scarcity of women managers in the company, a coworker of Milliren's being told to be more like the boys to succeed; the statement that she would have been one of only two women LGMs in the company out of 500 LGMs had she completed the GMPD; and the refusal to hire a woman with children as a customer service manager. The company's contention that the subpoena in this case should not be enforced because it is analogous to the one that the Seventh Circuit declined to enforce in EEOC v. United Air Lines, 287 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2002), is meritless. See Schwan's br. at 49-51. In that case, an American flight attendant based in Paris alleged in her EEOC charge that the company's failure to make contributions to the French social security system constituted national origin and sex discrimination. 287 F.3d at 646. The EEOC subpoenaed information pertaining to "each and every benefit received by employees of United Airlines who are French citizens residing in France including, but not limited to, health insurance, unemployment insurance-or its equivalent, pension or social security benefits, medical or family leave benefits," and information about all employees residing abroad, among other large categories of information. Id. at 646-47. United also offered evidence that it would take "5.5 employees working 2000 hours a piece for an entire year to comply with the subpoena as written." Id. at 648. The court of appeals determined that nothing in the charge suggested systemic discrimination based on the provision of benefits outside the French social security disability program specified in the charge. Id. at 654. The court of appeals was also persuaded that the EEOC's request was overly burdensome and would place a significant demand on the company that did not justify the EEOC's "tangential need for the information." Id. at 655. This case is nothing like United Airlines. The investigation is focused on one of the company's programs-the GMDP, not all of the company's employment practices. A.158 (subpoena). As the United Airlines court stated, "[i]n the context of an investigation of an individual complaint, it might well be most natural to focus on that employing unit or work unit from which came the decision of which the individual complainant complains; within such a unit the EEOC might well need a wide spectrum of statistical data in order to illuminate the general policies bearing on the complainant's situation." Id. at 654. Here, the relevant work unit is the GMDP. The charge and subpoena reference only gender discrimination. The time parameter was just over three years at the time of the subpoena. A.158-59 (subpoena dated February 20, 2009, requested information "from 1/1/06 to the present"). And, unlike United, Schwan's has offered no evidence nor made a serious attempt to establish that producing the disputed documents would disrupt the company's normal business operations. See, e.g., EEOC v. Md. Cup Corp., 785 F.2d 471, 477 (4th Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Bay Shipbuilding Corp., 668 F.2d 304, 313 (7th Cir. 1981). See A.27 (Op. at 32 n.2) ("The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Schwan's has 'provided us with no evidence to support its bald assertion that responding to these requests was too burdensome.'") (quoting magistrate judge's order). Schwan's argues that the Commission decided not to bring an enforcement action on the first subpoena "undoubtedly because the original charge could not support it." Schwan's br. at 48. On the contrary, the EEOC has consistently taken the position that the subpoenaed information about the GMDP is relevant to Milliren's original charge. The EEOC originally issued a subpoena for that same information before the charge was amended. See A.103-105. Schwan's petitioned the Commission to revoke or modify the subpoena arguing, inter alia, that the information sought was not relevant to the charge. A.112, 119-21. The Commission denied the petition and directed the company to comply with the subpoena issued in conjunction with the original charge. See A.139. In that determination, the EEOC found the information sought to be relevant to Milliren's charge and stated, "the EEOC is entitled to obtain information even when the request focuses on the existence of patterns of discrimination in job classifications or hiring situations other than those that are specifically targeted in an individual charge of discrimination." A.137. Accordingly, there is no basis for the company's speculation that the EEOC recognized that the subpoena could not be sustained based on the original charge. Contrary to the company's assertion, there was nothing suspect or unreasonable about the EEOC's decision to forego efforts to enforce the original subpoena in court when the company continued to refuse to comply and Milliren offered to file an amended charge. That the Commission decided that it was more expeditious to proceed on Milliren's amended charge and attempt to avoid protracted litigation over the investigation of the original charge should not serve as a basis for attributing an improper motive from the Commission's attempt to obtain the information required to complete its investigation. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court enforcing the Commission's subpoena should be affirmed. Respectfully submitted, P. DAVID LOPEZ General Counsel LORRAINE C. DAVIS Acting Associate General Counsel VINCENT J. BLACKWOOD Assistant General Counsel _____________________________ Julie L. Gantz Attorney U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of General Counsel 131 M St., N.E., 5th Floor Washington, D.C. 20507-0001 (202) 663-4718 julie.gantz@eeoc.gov CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because it contains 10,077 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii). This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2003 in Times New Roman 14 point. ______________________________ Julie L. Gantz Attorney U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of General Counsel 131 M St., N.E., 5th Floor Washington, D.C. 20507-0001 (202) 663-4718 julie.gantz@eeoc.gov Dated: December 20, 2010 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Julie L. Gantz, hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing brief via the CM/ECF System on this 20th day of December, 2010. I also certify that the CM/ECF System will send notice of such filing to the following registered CM/ECF users: Counsel for Defendant/Appellant: William M. Hart Damon L. Highly MEAGHER & GEER P.L.L.P. 33 S. Sixth Street, Suite 4400 Minneapolis, MN 55402 Counsel for Amici Curiae: Rae T. Vann Laura A. Giantris NORRIS, TYSSE, LAMPLEY & LAKIS, LLP 1501 M Street, NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 _____________________________ Julie L. Gantz Attorney U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of General Counsel 131 M St., N.E., 5th Floor Washington, D.C. 20507-0001 (202) 663-4718 julie.gantz@eeoc.gov ********************************************************************************** <> <1> Schwan's statement that Milliren "didn't even allege" that "'an employer has violated Title VII'" (Schwan's br. at 22 (quoting Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 72 (emphasis added))) is curious, since the amended charge and the original charge both expressly state that Milliren believes the discrimination alleged is "in violation of Title VII." A.75 (original charge); A.148 (amended charge). <2> For the same reason, the Chamber of Commerce and the EEAC's concerns that Schwan's was denied "due process guaranties" (Amicus br. at 29-30) are not relevant in the subpoena enforcement context. <3> Schwan's also makes a convoluted argument that the amended charge does not relate back because the original charge alleges intentional discrimination and the EEOC "concedes that it wants to investigate potential class-wide disparate impact discrimination in the GMDP itself." Schwan's br. at 42. Apart from the fact that the EEOC made no such concession and the information sought in the subpoena would be relevant to a claim of disparate treatment, the EEOC's intentions in its investigation have nothing to do with the relation-back inquiry. As noted, that turns on whether the allegations in the amended charge are related to the allegations in the original charge. Schwan's makes no argument that the amended charge alleges only disparate impact discrimination.